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ABSTRACT 
Although theories in both evolutionary biology and economics predict that an individual’s health 
should be associated with the individual’s time preference, no prior study has been done to 
empirically support or refute such predictions. By collecting detailed measures of health, time 
preference, and expected longevity on a sample of individuals in townships around Durban, 
South Africa, this study breaks new ground by being the first to analyze in detail the relationship 
between time preference and health, in an area of the world with high mortality and morbidity. 
Interestingly, we find that both physical health and expectations of longevity have a U-shaped 
relationship with the person’s subjective discount rate. This suggests that those in very poor 
health have high discount rates, but those in very good health also have high discount rates. 
Similarly those with longevity expectations on the extremes have high discount rates.  The 
research question addressed by this pilot project is policy relevant, as the study tries to determine 
the importance of health in economic development, not from the commonly asserted 
productivity-gain argument, but from a much broader investment-for-the-future argument. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The utility from consumption in the future is, ceteris paribus, often “discounted” relative 
to the utility from consuming the same commodity bundle in the current period. “Time 
preference” is the term used to describe the phenomenon that people attach different values to 
the same consumption bundle depending on when consumption of that commodity bundle 
occurs. In this paper, we are concerned with the degree to which an individual discounts future 
consumption relative to current consumption, which we call the subjective discount rate or level 
of impatience. Where patience is the willingness to wait for something in the future, which 
corresponds to forgoing current consumption and its associated utility in exchange for future 
consumption and utility, impatience is the unwillingness to wait.  
Although time preference is commonly assumed in models of intertemporal choice, the 
literature does not fully explain why some people are more impatient than others. For example, 
some individuals manage to save money for retirement, whereas others with otherwise similar 
personal characteristics (like income, education, race, age, and sex) do not manage to save. 
Understanding the determinants of a person’s subjective discount rate is important because 
policies could be better tuned to induce more desirable results if they included an accurate 
estimate of people’s intertemporal optimization decisions, while, at the same time, decision tools 
and policy manipulable variables could be developed to shape people’s intrinsic subjective 
discount rates. In other words, policy analysts should be concerned about impatience because 
individuals underinvest in the future in many domains, including retirement savings and health. 
Furthermore, individuals could be encouraged to counter this underinvestment behavior if pre-
commitment devices were more readily available. An example is a pre-commitment to save, such 
as a retirement plan with savings rates tied to future salary increases (Thaler and Bernartzi, 2004) 
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or a fixed deposit account with large penalties for early withdrawal (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 
2006), or even a pre-commitment to fertility control such as an implantable contraceptive device 
that lasts two or more years instead of the condom that often requires last minute decision-
making. The intrinsic interest in policies or strategies that entail pre-commitment arises in 
situations where an individual would rather invest for the future but finds it difficult to resist the 
temptations of consuming in the present period. 
Recent advances in evolutionary biology, economics, psychology, and neuroscience have 
provided some clues as to the potential determinants of subjective discount rates (for a succinct 
review, see Read & Read 2004). Evolutionary biology assumes that subjective discount rates are 
exogenously dictated by one’s genes and models a person’s subjective discount rate as a product 
of natural selection to maximally propagate one’s genes (e.g., Rogers 1994; Sozou & Seymour 
2003). These models predict a subjective discount rate that peaks at a time in life (as proxied by 
age) when reproductive potential is high, so that resources can be expended on sexual 
reproduction to propagate genes, rather than saved.  
In contrast to the evolutionary biology approach, the field of economics models time 
preference from a utility maximization framework and derives subjective discount rates as 
outcomes of endogenous choice. Becker & Mulligan (1997) assume that each person is endowed 
with an initial level of subjective discount rate, but that rate can be modified by the individual 
investing time and resources to produce “future-oriented capital” to make the future more salient, 
allowing one to appreciate the future more and to place more weight on future utility of 
consumption -- leading to a lower subjective discount rate. Their model implies that an 
exogenous increase in longevity will correspondingly give consumers incentives to invest in 
“future-oriented capital” so that the extra life years gained can be better appreciated – resulting 
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in a lower subjective discount rate. In addition to longevity, subjective discount rate may also be 
related to health. Trostel & Taylor (2001) show that the increasing rate of decline in one’s ability 
to enjoy visceral pleasures, such as with natural ageing and declines in health over the lifecycle, 
is associated with increasing decline of marginal utility of consumption over time, resulting in an 
inverse relationship between subjective discount rate and age (as a proxy for health). Recently, 
neuroimaging data provide a physiological explanation of impatience. Data derived from 
participants’ choices between smaller sooner monetary rewards versus larger later monetary 
rewards show that separate processes (limbic areas versus the lateral prefrontal areas, 
respectively) regulate decisions regarding immediate rewards versus delayed rewards (McClure 
et al. 2004) and that a quasi-hyperbolic discount function (e.g., Laibson 1997) approximates 
neuroimaging and survey data better than alternative functional forms. Nevertheless, it is unclear 
at this time what factors (such as ageing, illness, or experience), if any, might alter the activities 
of these brain regions in making temporal decisions. 
We build our hypotheses based on the above theories and relate them to existing 
empirical findings. First, we expect the discount rate to be U-shaped when plotted against age, 
based on the theory developed in evolutionary biology and described above. Read & Read 
(2004) found evidence of a mostly U-shaped function using a survey of young, middle, and older 
aged adults in the United Kingdom.  
H1: The discount rate is high for young adults, low for middle-aged individuals, and 
high for older individuals. 
Second, the subjective discount rate may vary with health. We can expect this to be the 
case for a few reasons. Those in poor health may have a high subjective discount rate because 
they do not expect to live as long. Besides longevity reasons, those in poor health may expend 
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more resources to improve health (or prevent further health decline) than to build “future 
oriented capital” as in Becker & Mulligan (1997), resulting in a higher subjective discount rate. 
Although poor health may be associated with a high subjective discount rate, the theory by 
Trostel and Taylor (2004) suggests that those in very good health may also have a high 
subjective discount rate because they derive greater utility from consumption when healthy than 
when sick. A few studies have also empirically examined the relationship between one’s health 
and one’s subjective discount rate, but these studies used somewhat limited measures for health 
and found mixed results. Kirby et al. (2002) used body mass index (BMI) and found no 
relationship; Read & Read (2004) used two dichotomous variables for health (good vs. bad 
health; existence of disease in last year vs. no existence of disease in last year) and found poor 
health to be unrelated to the subjective discount rate for money but related to the subjective 
discount rate for vacation; and Tu et al. (2004) found BMI and general health to be positively 
associated with the subjective discount rate for money, linking obesity with impatience but also 
good health with impatience. Based on these theories and empirical studies, we expect the 
discount rate to be U-shaped when plotted against health. 
H2: Those in very poor or very good health have a high subjective discount rate, 
and those with average health have a lower discount rate. 
Third, we expect the subjective discount rate to be inversely correlated with expected 
longevity. Individuals that do not expect to live long will expend their resources in the current 
period. Bloom et al. (2003), in a cross country panel study of national savings rates, found 
evidence of a relationship between increased longevity and increased savings behavior. Picone et 
al. (2004), using the U.S. Health and Retirement Study population, found that increased 
longevity is associated with investments in health. Thornton (2007) found that people in Malawi 
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who learned they were HIV negative and were optimistic about their future infection risks had 
higher subjective life expectancies and were more likely to invest in agricultural inputs than 
those who tested positive or were pessimistic about their future risks. 
H3: The subjective discount rate will be inversely correlated with expected 
longevity. 
In this paper, we try to add some insight into the determinants of subjective discount rates 
by testing the above hypotheses. We continue by discussing the survey data that we collected, 
and then we describe our results. Next, we explore potential explanations for our results, list the 
weaknesses and strengths of our study, and conclude with policy implications.  
METHOD 
Participants and Procedures  
This study is part of a larger study on the impact of poor health and HIV/AIDS on micro and 
small enterprises (MSEs) around Durban, South Africa. The sample is described in detail in 
Chao et. al. (2007). Surveys were conducted over a three year period in select townships around 
Durban, South Africa, with information on health, business activity, and general demographics. 
Time preference measures were collected during the third year of the survey, and this paper is 
based on the results from the total of 175 individuals that had complete responses to questions on 
time preference, health, and other related variables collected during the third-year survey.  
Measures 
Five parts of the questionnaire were used to measure the respondent’s subjective discount rate, 
physical and mental health, subjective probabilities of one-, five-, and ten-year survival, planning 
and savings behavior, expectations of future economic condition and income.  
Subjective discount rate. The first set of questions adopts the time preference instrument 
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originally developed by Kirby and Marakovic (1996) and also used in Kirby et al. (1999). The 
questionnaire presents participants with a set of 27 hypothetical choices between smaller sooner 
rewards and larger later rewards. An example of one of the choices in this instrument is “Would 
you prefer $34 today to $50 in 30 days?” From these choices, an overall subjective discount rate 
can be calculated. The respondents in Kirby et al. (1999) had a one in six chance of actually 
receiving real payoffs. In our experiment, all responses were hypothetical, and we used the South 
African Rand (which had an exchange rate at the time of survey of about 6.7 rand to the dollar). 
It is not obvious whether having a real payoff from the time preference questions would have 
resulted in better measures of impatience. The literature provides conflicting evidence as to 
whether answers to hypothetical time preference questions differed from those with real payoffs. 
Coller and Williams (1999), using a between subject design, found the discount rates from 
hypothetical questions to be larger than those from questions with real payoffs; however, 
Johnson and Bickel (2002), using a within subject design, found no statistical difference in 
discount rates derived from real and hypothetical questions.  
 In this study, we decided not to use real payoffs for two pressing issues. First, we were 
unable to make a 100% guarantee of delivery of the future reward to our participants (due to 
respondent trust, relocation, and other logistical issues). Without 100% certainty that a chosen 
future reward would be delivered, the measured discount rates would reflect not only impatience, 
but also the risk premium that the participants attach to the uncertainty of receiving the chosen 
future reward. Although the direction of such a bias would likely be choice for the immediate 
reward (i.e., a higher measured discount rate), the magnitude of such a bias would be unobserved 
and would likely differ by participants. Eliciting time preference using real money, thus, would 
more likely result in this kind of bias that could not be controlled for by our statistical procedures 
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in the analysis. We have shown elsewhere that health is related to trusting behavior (Chao & 
Kohler 2007). Because health is a key explanatory variable in our regressions, we did not want to 
create an omitted variable bias (i.e., “trust in the interviewer’s ability to deliver a future reward”) 
that was correlated with both health and discount rates.  
 The second reason that we did not give real monetary rewards was that we did not want 
the participants to “think too much” about the monetary tradeoffs. Real monetary rewards have 
been purported to create incentives for participants to exert cognitive effort in answering survey 
questions (Camerer & Hogarth 1999; Read 2005), but time preference questions of the type 
asked in our survey have also been scrutinized and criticized for measuring outside lending and 
borrowing opportunities rather than impatience in consumption (Coller & Williams 1999; Cubitt 
& Read 2007). Because the goal of our study was to find determinants of impatience rather than 
outside financial opportunities, we used monetary tradeoffs that were hypothetical, so as to 
minimize the incentive for the participants to answer after careful calculations. In fact, our 
interviewers were trained to instruct the respondents to answer these monetary tradeoff questions 
quickly and based on “gut feeling” rather than careful introspective mathematical calculation.  
Health Measures. We used the SF12 health status instrument, which consists of 12 questions 
that assess symptoms, functioning, and quality of life among two dimensions: mental and 
physical health. Examples of questions included in the SF12 are “Do you have any health 
problems that limit you in carrying out moderate activities? (For example walking to transport or 
helping at home. If so, how much?)” and “How much of the time during the past 4 weeks did 
you have a lot of energy?” Also, one of the 12 questions is a self-assessed general health 
question in which the respondent is asked to rate his/her health into five categories, ranging from 
excellent to poor. Separate scores for physical health (PCS12) and for mental health (MCS12) 
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are obtained by weighting each question according to a formula (Ware et al. 1995). This 
instrument was designed to be easily administered and answered even by individuals that cannot 
read and has been validated in many developing countries in various languages.  
Subjective Probabilities of Survival. The next set of questions asked individuals about their 
subjective probabilities of survival from 0% to 100% to measure how certain the respondent is 
that he/she will not die in the next 1, 5, or 10 years. (Although, we are not technically calculating 
longevity, in the text we sometimes refer to longevity, so the reader should be aware that we are 
calculating subjective survival probabilities.) A similar question is asked in the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) in the U.S. Smith et al. (2001) `demonstrate that respondents not only 
can answer these questions, but that their answers indeed predict how long they will live.  
Planning and Savings Behavior. We asked two questions about the respondents’ planning 
behavior and another two questions about the respondents’ savings behavior. For the planning 
behavior, we asked whether the respondents classified themselves as planning ahead all the time 
or living from day to day. Similarly, for savings behavior, we asked whether the respondents 
classified themselves as preferring to spend money to enjoy life today or to save more for the 
future. These questions were modeled after the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
Expectations of Economic and Business Situation in the Next Two Years. Because current 
versus future marginal utility of consumption depends on the income level in the two time 
periods, we asked all respondents whether they expected the economic situation of their 
community to improve a lot, improve a little, remain the same, decline a little, or decline a lot in 
the next two years. Among the owners of small businesses, we also asked an additional question 
on their expectations of income growth from their own business for the following two years. 
Data Analysis 
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To estimate a subjective discount rate for each individual, we assume a hyperbolic discount 
function, where the present value V of a delayed reward is determined by 
kD
AV
+
=
1
, 
where A is the reward, D is the delay, and k is the parameter that determines the subjective 
discount rate (Mazur 1987; Kirby & Marakovic 1996). This function has been shown by many 
authors to provide a good fit to time preference data elicited by similar methods (e.g., Kirby et. 
al. 1999; Laibson 1997; McClure 2004). Unlike exponential discount functions (which assume a 
constant per-period discount rate regardless of the time interval), hyperbolic discount functions 
allow for a higher per-period discount rate for delays in the immediate future but lower per-
period discount rate for long delays – allowing for the function to better approximate time 
preferences with an immediacy premium. Given the high mortality and morbidity rates and the 
overall uncertainty in the environment of our sample population, our respondents may have a 
preference for immediate reward above and beyond a constant level of impatience. The 
hyperbolic discount function is not without controversy, however, as various recent experiments 
using similar time preference elicitation methods suggest that a constant per-period discount 
function like the exponential discount function cannot be rejected by the data, especially after a 
fixed cost to any delay is allowed (Benhabib, Bisin, & Schotter 2006; Coller, Harrison, & 
Rustrom 2003; Read, Airoldi, & Loewe 2005). Because two of the major papers most related to 
ours used different functions to calculate the subjective discount rate (Read & Read 2004 used an 
exponential function and Kirby et al. 2002 used a hyperbolic function), we also used the 
exponential discount function in our analyses and found that the results and conclusions did not 
differ by discount function.  
 Using the calculated subjective discount rate for each participant, we analyzed the 
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bivariate relationships between the subjective discount rate and the respondents’ demographic 
characteristics, as well as their age, health, and expectations of their own subjective survival 
probability to live a certain number of years. We then performed multivariate regressions. 
Because the subjective discount rates elicited by the hypothetical monetary tradeoffs are 
constrained to be between 0.00016 and 0.25, we used two-sided tobit regressions to account for 
the left- and right-side censoring of the calculated subjective discount rate.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
We have 175 individuals in the sample, 73% are female, 46% are married or have a cohabiting 
partner. The mean age of the sample is just above 46 years, ranging from 18 to 91. In terms of 
education, 6% of respondents have no formal education, 20% have some primary, 13% have 
finished primary school, 29% have some secondary, 21% have finished secondary school, 4% 
have some tertiary school, and 7% have finished tertiary school. Of the 175 respondents in our 
sample, 95 (55%) are either currently running a small business or ran a business that has recently 
closed. 
 Health Status: The respondents’ mean physical and mental health scores for the SF12 are 
42.4 and 51.8, respectively, with standard deviations of 12.1 and 10.9. The mean health score in 
our population is lower than that in the United States (which has a normalized score of 50), 
although the standard deviation is similar (at around 10) (Ware et al. 1995). Twenty-two percent 
of respondents report their health to be excellent, 25% report their health to be very good, 28% 
report their health to be good, 21% report their health to be fair, and 4% report their health to be 
poor.  
 Subjective Probability of Survival: An analysis of the time horizon questions shows that 
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there is some variance in individuals’ expectations regarding how long they will live. Although 
38% say they are 100% confident that they will “live to this time next year,” 21% state at least a 
60% chance of not living until the next year. The mean response is an 82% confidence to live to 
the next year. When we asked individuals their expectations to living to this time in five years, 
25% expressed a 100% confidence that they would live to this time in 5 years, and 31% of 
respondents expressed a 50-50 chance of living to the next 5 years. The mean response was just 
above a 70% chance of living to the next 5 years. A similar pattern is found when we consider 
individuals’ expectations to live 10 years. While 19% of respondents are 100% confident that 
they will be alive, 48% of respondents expressed a 50-50 percent chance or lower of being alive 
in 10 years.  
//Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample// 
 Means Subjective discount rates: Subjective discount rates as calculated by the Kirby-
Marakovic method were relatively high in our sample, at 0.078, which is substantially higher 
than the subjective discount rates of both heroin addicts (0.025) and controls (0.013) studied by 
Kirby et al. (1999) in the U.S., but lower than the median subjective discount rates (0.12) found 
by Kirby et al. (2002) among the Tsimane’ Amerindians in Bolivia. We found a skewed 
distribution of subjective discount rates. Although a large number of individuals exhibit 
subjective discount rates that are within the ranges found in other studies such as Kirby et al. 
(1999), there is also a large number of individuals displaying the highest subjective discount rate 
(31 in 175), and a significant number of individuals displaying the lowest subjective discount 
rate (7 in 175), which reflects the censoring of the subjective discount rates due to the nature of 
the monetary-choice tradeoffs in our questionnaire. The high proportion of right-censored 
observations confirms the hypothesis that individuals suffer from a bias towards immediate 
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gratification in this subsample. Figures 1a and 1b show the frequency distributions of the 
subjective discount rates and of the natural log of the subjective discount rates, with the lines 
representing a kernel density estimation and the best-fitting normal distribution. 
//Figure 1a and 1b; Frequency Diagram of dr and ln(dr)// 
Subjective discount rate, Socioeconomics, Age, Health, Survival.  
We also looked at the bivariate relationship between the subjective discount rate and the various 
socioeconomic variables, age, health, and survival expectations, and these are presented in Table 
2a. It is interesting to note that gender, marital status, business ownership, and income level of 
the respondent’s area of residence were not statistically significantly related to subjective 
discount rate.  
//Table 2a: (need new revised table) Mean Subjective discount rate, by Sociodemographics// 
 We also examined the Spearman rank correlations between the individual subjective 
discount rate and education, age, physical health, mental health, and subjective survival 
probability. The results are shown in the bottom half of Table 2a. It is interesting to note that 
none of these variables is rank-correlated with subjective discount rate. This could either be 
because a relationship between these variables and the subjective discount rate does not exist, or 
that the relationship is non-linear. Because the theoretical predictions (see Introduction above) 
suggest that the relationship between age and subjective discount rate may be non-linear and 
perhaps U-shaped, we also plotted the subjective discount rate against age, health, and subjective 
survival probability. We do not find any relationship between subjective discount rate and age, 
but the relationship between subjective discount rate and health and between subjective discount 
rate and survival probability are both U-shaped. 
//Figure 2a,b,c: Subjective discount rate vs. Age, PCS12, Survival// 
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We also examined the relationship between subjective discount rates and several 
behavioral variables that are often linked with time preference, such as willingness to plan for the 
future and to save money. We found that respondents that claimed that they “planned their life 
ahead all the time” had lower subjective discount rates than those that claimed to “live more 
from day to day” (0.066 compared to 0.106, p=0.0085, one-tailed). Also, those that preferred to 
“spend money and enjoy life now” had higher subjective discount rates than those that preferred 
to “save more for the future” (0.110 compared to 0.067, p=0.01, one-tailed). Because planning 
and savings require a preference for waiting for a larger reward in the future, these behaviors are 
good tests for the construct validity of our discount rate measure. Indeed, the results in Table 2b 
suggest that the level of patience as measured by our subjective discount rate is consistent with 
the planning and savings behaviors in our sample. 
//Table 2b: Spearman Correlation: Subjective discount rate, by Selected Behavioral Variables// 
Two-Sided Tobit Regressions 
We performed a series of regressions using both ordinary least squares and two-sided 
tobit, with both subjective discount rate and the natural log of the subjective discount rate as the 
dependent variable. The results were similar but not identical, and our main conclusions remain 
the same with the various specifications. Given that the subjective discount rate is censored from 
the left and the right and that the subjective discount rate is highly skewed without the log 
transformation, we present below the results obtained from two-sided tobit regressions with 
ln(subjective discount rate) as the dependent variable. 
 In order to test Hypothesis 1 that the subjective discount rate should be related to age, we 
first regressed ln(subjective discount rate) on age and age square. The results are shown in 
column one. It is noteworthy that although the subjective discount rate appeared to have a U-
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shape relationship with respect to age, the estimates were only marginally significant, while at 
the same time, age and age-squared were not jointly significant. Gender and marital status were 
insignificant. Those who had no education had a very significantly higher subjective discount 
rate than those with at least some primary school education.  
//Table 3: Two-Sided Tobit Regression of ln(subjective discount rate)// 
 We next examined Hypotheses 2 and 3 to test whether health and survival probability 
were associated with subjective discount rates, and these results are presented in specifications 
(2) through (5) in Table 3. Physical health, but not mental health, was highly significantly 
associated with the subjective discount rate. The significance of the age variable disappeared 
with the inclusion of the health variables; this suggests that rather than age, it may be the level of 
physical health that explains the U-shaped pattern found in previous studies. Given that health 
may be associated with the subjective discount rate through its effect on mortality risk, we next 
added the one-year subjective probability of survival to the regression. (Because the questions to 
elicit the subjective discount rates were all framed with a delay that is less than one year, we use 
the 1-year survival probability in our analyses below; the results from using the 5- or 10-year 
survival probability variable bear similar trends as the 1-year.) Interestingly, as shown in 
specification (5) of Table 3, survival was not only highly significant, but inclusion of the survival 
variables reduced both the magnitude and the significance level of the physical health variables – 
suggesting that part of the effect of the health variable on subjective discount rate was via the 
relationship between health and survival. In regressions not reported in Table 3, we also included 
one-year survival without the health variables; the coefficient magnitude and significance level 
of the survival variables were not reduced with the inclusion of the health variables. This 
suggests that the effect of survival on discounting is not via health, but part of the effect of health 
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on discounting is via survival. 
From specification (5) in Table 3, it is apparent that the relationship between the 
subjective discount rate and both health and survival was U-shaped, supporting hypothesis 2 but 
in contrast to hypothesis 3. This suggests that those in very poor health have high subjective 
discount rates, but those in very good health also have high subjective discount rates. Similarly 
those with both high and low survival probabilities (but not those in between), display high 
subjective discount rates. In fact, the nadir of the U-relationship between subjective discount rate 
and health occured when PCS12 was 37.8, or slightly below the mean physical health level of the 
sample. The nadir for the U-shaped relationship between the subjective discount rate and the 
one-year survival probability occured at around 75%, or slightly below the mean subjective 
survival probability for the sample.  
 Expanding income or consumption opportunity in the future may reduce the marginal 
utility of consumption in the future (and hence lead to greater discounting of the future). To 
control for the potential confounding effects that this might have on our results, we included a 
variable on the respondent’s subjective outlook for the overall economic environment in their 
community in the next two years. (Ten respondents did not answer this question and were 
excluded from subsequent analysis.) Although this variable is not the same as the respondents’ 
subjective outlook for their own future consumption opportunity, to the extent that the subjective 
outlook for own future consumption is correlated with that for their community, our variable 
may still proxy for the effect of expanding or declining consumption or income possibilities on 
the subjective discount rate. The results, shown in specification (6), show that those who thought 
the economy was going to worsen a lot in the next two years (the omitted dummy) had the lowest 
subjective discount rate. We also find that people with good future income prospects have a 
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higher subjective discount rate, but also that the U-shaped relationship between the subjective 
discount rate and health persists. Although the linear term is no longer significant at conventional 
levels, the linear and quadratic terms combined are jointly significant in the model. Moreover, 
because 6% of our sample did not respond to the question on prospects of future income, our 
sample size was further reduced when we controlled for income expectations in the model. 
Nevertheless, these results suggest that both health and longevity have a U-shaped relationship 
with the subjective discount rate and that both are independent predictors of time preference. 
DISCUSSION 
Several of our main findings are surprising. Our first main finding is that age is not a 
significant predictor of time preference, and is in contrast to the findings in Kirby et al. (2002) 
and Read & Read (2004). In our sample, age was only significant in models where physical 
health level was not included as a regressor. Our findings differ from those of these authors for at 
least two reasons. One is that only 25% of our sample consists of people over the age of 55 and 
that our sample may not contain enough older people to show an age effect, whereas Read & 
Read (2004) concentrated their sample selection based on three age strata, with the oldest strata 
around age 70. Notably, we are comparing different kinds of people in very different 
environments. The other reason is that expected longevity, not age, may be a true underlying 
determinant of people’s subjective discount rates. In populations where age does correlate well 
with expected longevity, the effect of longevity on subjective discount rates can be well-
manifested by the effects from age. However, because causes of mortality in South Africa are not 
necessarily related to age (e.g., mortality from HIV/AIDS affects more people less than age 40 
than above), age is no longer a strong predictor of subjective discount rates. 
Our second main finding is the U-shaped relationship between health and the subjective 
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discount rate. This is a very interesting and important finding, and although we predicted this 
relationship, no one else has either tested for it or found evidence for it. The few studies that did 
examine the relationship between health and the subjective discount rate use of crude measures 
of health. Furthermore, a non-linear relationship between health and the subjective discount rate 
could have also contributed to the lack of any significant (linear) relationship assumed in these 
other studies. We give more detail here to better explain the U-shaped relationship between the 
subjective discount rate and health; however, we cannot yet determine which of the explanations 
is driving the real relationship that we find, and it is even very likely that they coexist and that it 
is exactly the interaction that determined the observed pattern. Our finding that those with 
average health have lower discount rate than those who are very healthy or very sick could be 
due to several reasons. First, according to Trostel & Taylor (2002) and Olsho (2006), the ability 
to enjoy consumption depends on an individual’s health, and the healthier an individual, the 
greater the enjoyment of the same commodity bundle. Because health generally declines over the 
life cycle, individuals should have a high subjective discount rate when healthy and, thus, enjoy 
the consumption while they still can. Second, people who are not very healthy are likely those 
who were once very healthy but have now experienced some health decline; these people may 
long for their better health in the past, which motivates them to start examining the past and the 
future in general, so that the future becomes more salient (as in Liu & Aaker 2006 and Becker & 
Mulligan 1997), resulting in a lower subjective discount rate for the future. The foregoing 
explains why people of average health may have lower subjective discount rates than those with 
very good health. We also find a higher subjective discount rate among people with very poor 
health, and this finding is robust to having controlled for longevity (and hence wanting to spend 
resources before death cannot explain this finding). People with very poor health may have more 
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immediate need for cash to pay for medical care or for daily survival (perhaps because they are 
too sick to work), hence the unwillingness to wait for the larger reward.  
Our third main finding is the U-shaped relationship between the subjective discount rate 
and survival probability after controlling for current physical and mental health status. It is 
reasonable for people with low expected survival to have a high subjective discount rate, because 
their future consumption may never come. This is what we expected to find (Hypothesis 3). It is 
somewhat perplexing as to why those with a very high expected survival probability also highly 
discount the future. We believe that saliency of time may explain this finding (as in the argument 
for the saliency of health and its decline above). Liu & Aaker (2006) showed that personal 
experience with someone who died of cancer is associated with decisions that favor long-term 
future over the short-term present, and this effect seems to be related to the “salience and 
concreteness regarding one’s future life course, shifting focus away from the present toward the 
long run.” It is thus plausible that people who expect a very high probability of survival may not 
have had cues from the environment to tell them otherwise; mortality to them is nonexistent. 
However, as they experience deaths from social and family networks, death becomes more 
salient. They not only start to revise downward their expected survival probability, but they also 
start to think more about the future. As the future becomes more salient, they are more likely to 
invest in “future oriented capital” and will discount the future less (as in Becker & Mulligan 
1997).  
LIMITATIONS & STRENGTHS 
Our study provides seminal and thought provoking findings in terms of the relationship 
between the individual subjective discount rate and age, health, survival, and future consumption 
or income opportunities. While the study is subject to many limitations, our study also has 
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strengths that overcome many other studies´ weaknesses. We first discuss the limitations, 
followed by the strengths, and we end with some policy implications of our results. 
The first limitation to our study is that we had a small sample that consisted of a majority 
of business operators. While this gave us confidence that the answers to questions involving 
monetary tradeoffs were less likely to be subject to the problems of low mathematical literacy, it 
is unclear whether our results from a mostly mathematically-literate population are fully 
generalizable to the general population in the developing world.  
The second limitation is that we did not have good measures of household assets and 
income; we only have measures of business profit and the income strata where the respondents 
resided. Relative to the highest income area, the fixed effects for low and middle income areas 
were consistently negative and some statistically significantly negative, which indicates that 
respondents in the lower income areas have lower subjective discount rates than those from the 
highest income area. This finding is opposite to that found by Read & Read (2004), who also 
included income strata for their time preference study among populations of the United Kingdom 
and found that high income strata were associated with a lower subjective discount rate. This 
seeming contradiction may be because all of our respondents are poor, just that some are less 
poor than others. Even our “high income” strata would be considered the lowest income strata in 
Read & Read’s study population.  
The third limitation is that although most theoretical models of time preference assume 
that ability to enjoy consumption now and ability to enjoy consumption in the future (and their 
difference) would be important determinants of subjective discount rate, our study did not have a 
measure for “ability to enjoy future consumption.” We also lack a variable on expected health in 
the future, which might have been a good proxy for the felicity function as expounded by Trostel 
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& Taylor (2001) and as implicitly assumed in Becker & Mulligan (1997). Other studies also 
suffer from this problem. To try and address this issue, we used data on the respondents´ current 
and prior health, instead of future physical health, but these past health and past health change 
variables were all insignificant determinants of subjective discount rates.  
 Despite the foregoing limitations, our study does have many strengths that improve on 
others’ studies. First, our results are compelling because, despite a small sample size, our results 
are robust to different specifications. We found that physical health, physical health squared, 
survival probability, and survival probability squared were significant in most of the 
specifications explained here as well as numerous others that we tried.  
 Second, we used comprehensive measures of health status that have been culturally 
validated in Zulu speaking populations in South Africa (personal communication with Michelle 
Koch of Qualitymetrics). The SF12 instrument combines multiple symptoms into one summary 
scale each for physical health and for mental health, and is less subject to systematic 
measurement error than single question health status measures (Dow et al. 1997). No other study 
on time preference that we are aware of has incorporated the use of health status instruments; 
most used only dichotomous categorization of good versus bad health or body mass index, which 
may not be sensitive enough to capture the multiple dimensions of health and health differences 
in the sample population. As suggested in the discussion, our use of a comprehensive measure of 
health may be what contributed to our capturing the U-shaped relationship between health and 
the subjective discount rate. 
 Third, our study is also the first to incorporate subjective probabilities of survival as a 
determinant of time preference. Although most theories on why there is time preference make 
use of mortality risk as one factor that reduces the utility of future consumption, most empirical 
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studies on time preference resort to the use of age as the variable of interest. However, age 
proxies for a lot of factors in life, with mortality risk as only one such factor. In particular, many 
studies confound the differential effects of age and expected length of life on discounting. 
Although age is correlated with health and expected survival probability, in sub-Saharan Africa 
where morbidity and mortality risks are very high and where disease profiles are not necessarily 
related to ageing, age may not be a good proxy for morbidity and mortality. For instance, HIV 
morbidity and mortality afflict people age 20-40 far more than those below 20 or above 40 
(Shisana et al. 2005). 
 Fourth, our study is the first to simultaneously control for age, health, survival, and future 
consumption opportunities as co-determinants of the subjective discount rate. We separately 
measure age, health, and expected length of life – all of which are very distinct. This teases apart 
the contributions of each of these variables to time preference. For example, up to 15% of all 
mortality in South Africa is non-health related and non-age related (e.g., homicide, suicide, 
accidents; Statistics South Africa 2005). This should be reflected in longevity expectations, not 
in health or in age. Further, our use of two-sided tobit regression also allows for less bias in the 
estimation of these relationships, especially in the face of both left and right censoring of the 
calculated subjective discount rate.  
 Fifth, our study incorporates a subjective economic outlook variable that may proxy for 
consumption and income opportunities in the near future. Although all economic theories of time 
preference subsume future consumption opportunity as a determinant of subjective discount rate, 
no empirical study has included such a variable. 
 Finally, despite the set of 27 questions used to measure time preference, the consistency 
of the answers is above 90%, which suggests that the respondents were not answering randomly. 
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Moreover, based on the answers to the other questions in the survey about planning and savings 
behavior, our time preference measure also shows strong construct validity in measuring 
willingness to wait for the future. 
In view of the strengths but also the limitations of our data, our results should be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, we find important and novel results regarding the 
relationship between health and the subjective discount rate and longevity and the subjective 
discount rate. 
Our study has important policy implications. Our finding that subjective discount rates 
differ by health levels implies that economic evaluation of healthcare programs that use results 
from surveys of the public (who are likely to be healthier than those that are helped by the 
potential health programs) may be inaccurately weighting future costs and benefits by not taking 
into consideration that the subjective discount rate is a function of health status. Furthermore, the 
provision of healthcare and health insurance (especially in countries with low health levels) may 
improve health and survival, leading to more future-oriented thinking and investments for the 
future;  this positive externality should not be neglected in welfare analysis of these social 
programs. Finally, there is the possibility that those who think they are extremely healthy or will 
live forever discount the future more because of lack of information. This impedes their ability to 
put the future into proper perspective, resulting in non-optimal inter-temporal trade-offs with 
potential for regret later in life. Here, public health education to make the future more salient 
may be an additional policy tool; alternatively, development and provision of pre-commitment 
devices may also be welfare improving. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Mean
(S.D.)
Female (%) 72.57
Married or Cohabiting (%) 45.71
Education (% with no education) 6.29
Belief that the economy will worsen a lot (%) 6.10
Belief that income will decrease a lot (%) 4.82
Age 46.52
(15.09)
SF12 Scores
     PCS12 (physical health score) 47.48
(12.06)
     MCS12 (mental health score) 51.90
(10.86)
Subjective probability of survival
     Probability of being alive in 1 year (%) 81.83
(19.71)
     Probability of being alive in 5 years (%) 70.23
(26.04)
     Probability of being alive in 10 years (%) 57.77
(31.11)
Overall Discount Rates 0.078
(0.084)
Number of observations 175
Figure 1a: Frequency Diagram of Discount Rate
Figure 1b: Frequency Diagram of ln(Discount Rate)
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Table 2a: Mean Discount Rate, by Sociodemographic Variables
Significance of Difference
Mean Discount Rate Between Groups
Gender
     Male 0.071 Kruskal Wallace = 0.000; df = 1
     Female 0.081 p = 0.992
Marital Status
     Married or Cohabiting 0.089 Krukal Wallace = 0.244; df = 1
     Single, Divorced, Widowed 0.069 p = 0.621
Business Ownership
     Business Owner or Past Owner 0.083 Kruskal Wallace = 0.614; df = 1
     Never Owner 0.077 p = 0.433
Income
     High Income 0.083 Kruskal Wallace = 1.706; df = 2
     Middle Income 0.067 p = 0.426
     Low Income 0.087
Education
     Lowest Quintile 0.099 Spearman Rank Correlation
     2nd Quintile 0.063 rho = -0.040
     3rd Quintile 0.057 p = 0.603
     4th Quintile 0.070
     Highest Quintile 0.073
Age
     Lowest Quintile 0.080 Spearman Rank Correlation
     2nd Quintile 0.065 rho = -0.042
     3rd Quintile 0.071 p = 0.585
     4th Quintile 0.072
     Highest Quintile 0.079
Physical Health (pcs12)
     Lowest Quintile 0.082 Spearman Rank Correlation
     2nd Quintile 0.074 rho = 0.072
     3rd Quintile 0.065 p = 0.344
     4th Quintile 0.044
     Highest Quintile 0.095
Mental Health (mcs12)
     Lowest Quintile 0.077 Spearman Rank Correlation
     2nd Quintile 0.051 rho = 0.028
     3rd Quintile 0.080 p = 0.714
     4th Quintile 0.067
     Highest Quintile 0.088
1-Year Survival Probability
     Lowest Quintile 0.114 Spearman Rank Correlation
     2nd Quintile 0.075 rho = 0.108
     3rd Quintile 0.050 p = 0.156
     4th Quintile 0.065
     Highest Quintile 0.075
Table 2b: Mean Discount Rate, by Selected Behavioral Variables
Planning Horizon
     Plan Ahead All the Time 0.066 one-tailed ttest
     Live from Day to Day 0.106 p = 0.009
Savings Behavior
     Prefer Saving Money 0.067 one-tailed ttest
     Prefer Spending Money 0.110 p = 0.010
Figure 2a: Discount Rate vs. Age, Plot and Fitted Values
Figure 2b: Discount Rate vs. PCS12, Plot and Fitted Values
Figure 2c: Discount Rate vs. One-Year Survival Probability, Plot and Fitted Values
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Table 3: Double-Sided Tobit Regression: ln(dr_kirby*100) as the dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 3.855*** 7.292*** 2.619 6.988** 9.623*** 7.469**
(1.291) (2.234) (2.754) (3.415) (3.577) (3.664)
Age -0.093* -0.080 -0.082 -0.067 -0.039 -0.030
(0.055) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
Age*Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Female 0.414 0.434 0.416 0.422 0.448 0.242
(0.362) (0.360) (0.363) (0.361) (0.355) (0.344)
Married or Cohabiting 0.087 0.040 0.076 0.025 -0.046 0.175
(0.351) (0.348) (0.352) (0.349) (0.343) (0.333)
Area Dummy = Ntuzuma C -0.911 -0.903 -0.866 -0.856 -0.792 -0.854
(0.570) (0.563) (0.572) (0.566) (0.573) (0.562)
Area Dummy = Klaarwater -0.456 -0.457 -0.446 -0.462 -0.628 -0.314
(0.513) (0.508) (0.516) (0.511) (0.504) (0.486)
Area Dummy = Umlazi J -0.881 -0.744 -0.825 -0.676 -0.761 -1.056**
(0.543) (0.538) (0.547) (0.542) (0.474) (0.532)
Area Dummy = Kwa Mgaga -0.897 -0.962* -0.855 -0.911* -0.926* -0.667
(0.560) (0.555) (0.562) (0.557) (0.550) (0.530)
Area Dummy = Clare Estates -1.313** -1.341** -1.281** -1.297** -1.444*** -1.322**
(0.553) (0.545) (0.555) (0.548) (0.540) (0.508)
No education 2.330*** 2.171*** 2.391*** 2.163*** 2.322*** 3.003***
(0.725) (0.730) (0.749) (0.754) (0.752) (0.770)
PCS12 -0.233** -0.240** -0.165* -0.131
(0.096) (0.097) (0.099) (0.097)
PCS12 squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MCS12 0.024 -0.015 0.001 -0.045
(0.110) (0.109) (0.000) (0.112)
MCS12 squared -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Longevity -0.156*** -0.118**
(0.059) (0.059)
Longevity squared 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Economic Outlook for Next 2 Years
     Improve a lot 1.144
(0.875)
     Improve a little 1.727***
(0.679)
     Remain the same 1.417**
(0.666)
     Worsen a little 1.642**
(0.689)
Observations 164
Mean of the Dependent Variable 1.134
Pr > Chi-square 0.025 0.001 0.050 0.017 0.001 0.000
Pseudo R-square 0.029 0.039 0.031 0.040 0.051 0.069
Note:  Values in parentheses represent standard errors. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
175
1.117
